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Continuous Monitoring and the Status Quo Effect 
 
Abstract: Hunton et al. (2008) observed that while continuous monitoring reduced earnings 
management of discretionary expenditures, it also dampened the willingness of managers to 
increase investment in a risky but viable long-term project. The current study examines why 
continuous monitoring appeared to trigger such risk aversion. Sixty-one managers participated 
in a vignette-based experiment that replicated Hunton et al. (2008), except that instead of 
making their own decisions, participants evaluated a fictitious manager, Bob, who already 
made a decision consistent with the results reported in Hunton et al. (2008). This revised 
design seeks to minimize self-presentation bias while providing further evidence about the 
reasons for Hunton et al.’s (2008) results. As expected, we find that continuous monitoring 
(relative to periodic monitoring) increased the perceived likelihood that Bob’s decisions 
would be detected and the likelihood that Bob would be asked to justify his decisions to his 
superiors. We also find that managers rated the status quo decision to maintain the current 
level of investment in the ongoing project (made under continuous monitoring) easier to 
defend than either the decision to increase or decrease the current level of investment (made 
under periodic monitoring). Further, the status quo decision was viewed as equally credible 
and trustworthy to superiors as increasing the investment in the project, the latter being judged 
as most consistent with both the long-term success of the project and Bob’s future 
opportunities. Combined, these results suggest that continuous monitoring can increase the 
perceived need to justify, which in turn encourages managers to maintain the status quo. 
Implications for practice and research are discussed. 
 Key Words: continuous monitoring, accountability, justification, risk aversion. 
Data Availability: Contact the authors I. INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory suggests that appropriate monitoring of agents by principals and goal-
congruent incentive compensation contracts can reduce dysfunctional earnings management
1 
behaviors (Eisenhardt 1989; Indjejikian 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Consistent with 
agency theory, Hunton et al. (2008) reported that a goal-congruent (long-term) bonus coupled 
with periodic monitoring eliminated earnings management of discretionary expenditures and 
encouraged increased investment in an ongoing, risky project, while a goal-incongruent 
(short-term) bonus and periodic monitoring triggered earnings management of discretionary 
expenditures through decreased investment in the project. Also consistent with agency theory, 
continuous monitoring
2 decreased earnings management of discretionary expenditures in the 
presence of goal-incongruent incentives, yielding a functional effect. However, Hunton et al. 
(2008) observed a surprising dysfunctional effect in that continuous monitoring reduced the 
willingness of managers to increase investment in the project in the presence of either goal-
congruent or goal-incongruent incentives, relative to periodic monitoring. The current study 
extends Hunton et al. (2008) by providing insight into this dysfunctional effect and the 
apparent risk aversion triggered by continuous monitoring. Such insight is useful for 
deploying future applications of continuous monitoring in ways that maximize functional and 
minimize dysfunctional effects.  
We expect that continuous monitoring is perceived more likely to detect a manager’s 
decisions in the short run and, therefore, triggers increased perceived need to justify decisions 
                                                 
1 We define earnings management as using judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the organization or to influence 
contractual outcomes (Healy and Wahlen 1999). Earnings management can include manipulation of accruals or 
manipulation of discretionary expenditures (Roychowdhury 2006). 
2 We define continuous monitoring as the capability to track, in (near) real time, financial and non-financial 
information flowing through a company’s information systems (Hunton et al. 2008). As noted in Alles et al. 
(2008) though academic research often distinguishes between the terms continuous monitoring and continuous 
auditing, practice is less concerned with the term used and more concerned with the application of continuous 
technologies and methodologies. For consistency, we use the term continuous monitoring while recognizing that 
the term continuous auditing may also be applicable.    
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because of increased accountability (Seigel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). Psychology research 
suggests that an increase in the perceived need to justify decisions will amplify the status quo 
effect in which individuals resist, or procrastinate, decisions to change (Tetlock and Boettger 
1994). We hypothesize that the status quo effect is manifest in the perception that a decision 
to maintain the current level of investment is the easiest decision to defend and that this status 
quo decision is perceived to be as credible and trustworthy to superiors as the decision to 
increase the current investment in the risky project. We contend that the increase in perceived 
need to justify brought about by continuous monitoring coupled with the belief that 
maintaining status quo is an easily defensible decision, acceptable to superiors, helps to 
explain the apparent risk aversion observed in Hunton et al. (2008). 
  We build on the results established in Hunton et al. (2008), in which monitoring 
frequency (periodic or continuous) and incentive horizon (short- or long-term bonuses) were 
randomized between-participants. Using a somewhat novel methodology, we asked the 
participants to evaluate the decision of a fictitious manager, Bob, where that decision mirrored 
the findings of Hunton et al. (2008). This change in the experiment was designed to eliminate 
self-presentation bias and allow for more meaningful insight into the risk aversion 
phenomenon. Consistent with results from Hunton et al (2008), in the periodic monitoring by 
long-term incentive condition, participants were told that Bob increased quality control 
expenditures; in the periodic monitoring by short-term incentive condition, participants were 
told that Bob decreased these expenditures. In both continuous monitoring conditions, 
participants were told that Bob maintained the current level of quality control expenditures. 
Sixty-one experienced managers completed the experiment. The findings reveal that 
continuous monitoring indeed induced a monitoring effect wherein participants perceived that 
the monitoring system will more likely detect and report Bob’s decision, and that Bob will    
3 
 
more likely be asked to justify his decision to his superiors in the short-term. The decision to 
decrease the investment was viewed as not consistent with the long-term success of the 
project and very unethical, supporting Hunton et al.’s (2008) contention that decreasing the 
investment represented earnings management of discretionary expenditures, a sub-optimal 
decision. We also found that the decision to increase the investment was perceived most 
consistent with both the long-term success of the project and with Bob’s future opportunities 
for financial rewards—the optimal decision. In spite of the status quo not being the optimal 
decision, we found that the status quo decision was deemed the easiest to defend, and likely to 
be equally credible and trustworthy to superiors as the decision to increase the investment. 
Hence, the coupling of an increased perceived need to justify and the belief that superiors will 
accept the easily defended status quo decision are two factors that help to explain the 
dysfunctional effect of risk aversion found in Hunton et al. (2008). 
Our study contributes to both research and practice. Regarding research, we 
demonstrate that psychology theory related to perceived accountability, as applied to 
continuous monitoring, serves to extend and complement agency theory explanations of risk 
aversion. With respect to practice, our study implies that mechanisms aimed at 
communicating to both managers and their superiors the potential amplification of the status 
quo effect may need to be implemented along with continuous monitoring. For both research 
and practice, we offer several suggestions regarding how to properly channel the increased 
accountability that inevitably results when continuous monitoring is implemented.       
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background 
on continuous monitoring and develops research hypotheses. Sections III and IV present the 
experimental method and results, respectively. Section V provides conclusions. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
Prior research demonstrates that managers sometimes engage in behaviors that are not 
in the best long-term interest of the organization, such as earnings management (Healy 1985; 
Gaver et al. 1995; Holthausen et al. 1995; Guidry et al. 1999; Healy and Wahlen 1999). Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management in the context of managers who use 
judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the organization or to influence 
contractual outcomes. Earnings management can result in recognizing higher short-term 
earnings or cash flows at the expense of long-term earnings or cash flows. Roychowdhury 
(2006) suggests that earnings management does not always entail under- or over-statement of 
accruals; rather, it can involve the manipulation of ‘real’ activities, such as reducing 
discretionary expenditures in the short-term, with the same objectives of misleading others or 
influencing contractual outcomes. 
  Hunton et al. (2008) reported that continuous monitoring (CM) of managerial 
behaviors reduced earnings management of discretionary expenditures that were considered 
inappropriate and difficult to defend, even when the incentive contract was based on short-
term results—a functional effect. However, they also found that evaluation apprehension was 
induced by CM, which resulted in managers’ unwillingness to increase investments in a risky 
but viable project, even when such investment increased the probability of achieving a 
successful project outcome in the long-term—a dysfunctional effect. The objective of the 
current study is to extend Hunton et al. (2008) by providing evidence that helps explain why 
evaluation apprehension appeared to stimulate risk aversion toward increasing investment in 
an ongoing, viable, risky project.     
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Hunton et al. (2008) drew on agency theory to test the effect of CM as a control 
mechanism to better align agents’ and principals’ interests via a decrease in information 
asymmetry, thus serving as a deterrent to earnings management decisions. However, agency 
theory provides a less complete explanation for the apparent increase in risk aversion. We use 
psychology theory to provide a more complete explanation about the underlying processes 
that result in increased risk aversion.  
We suggest that CM decreases information asymmetry by increasing the immediacy of 
detecting managers’ decisions. Relative to periodic monitoring (PM), CM will more likely 
detect and report managers’ actions in the short-term because CM provides more frequent and 
current information to superiors. CM’s higher ability to detect managers’ decisions in the 
short-term will, in turn, result in higher perceived need to justify decisions in the short-term 
because managers will be more accountable. Accountability is a universal feature of decision-
making environments (Tetlock et al. 1989). Individuals are said to be accountable when their 
performance is monitored and the subsequent evaluation has tangible or intangible 
consequences for the decision-maker (Siegel-Jacobs and Yates 1996). Accountability refers to 
the expectation that one will be required to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to 
another (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Thus, the more frequent monitoring allowed by CM 
suggests that the perceived need to justify decisions in the short-term will be higher than 
under a PM regime.  
Individuals who are accountable yet fail to behave in ways for which they can 
construct an acceptable justification are typically subject to varying degrees of censure 
(Tetlock et al. 1989). As a result, the need to justify decisions to others in order to receive a 
favorable evaluation or to be judged as competent is a form of psychological pressure on 
decision-makers that can affect their judgments and decisions (Curley et al. 1986). The effects    
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of the need for justification are complex and can either decrease or increase judgment biases 
(Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Although accountability is a powerful motivator for decision-
makers to be careful, thorough and cautious when making decisions (Tetlock 1992; Tetlock 
and Boettger 1994), effort tends to be redirected to self-justification from self-criticism and 
task performance (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). The need for justification can decrease the 
impact of obviously unacceptable and unwarranted biases that are known to the audience 
(e.g., earnings management behavior found in Hunton et al. (2008) and represented by the 
decrease investment decision in the current study). However, the need for justification can 
also yield negative effects, as the need to justify shifts decision-makers’ attention from ‘good 
performance’ to ‘good justification of performance’ (Tetlock 1983). We suggest that higher 
perceived need to justify decisions in the short-term under CM can explain the apparent risk 
aversion seen in Hunton et al. (2008), where participants in CM basically chose to maintain 
the status quo, even when an increase in investment could increase the probability of the long-
term success of the project.  
Lerner and Tetlock (1999) summarize prior research that finds higher accountability 
results in individuals simply conforming to the views of the audience to whom they are 
accountable when those views are known. Given that the views of the organization’s superiors 
would generally be known to favor profitability, these research findings suggest that CM 
should have resulted in higher likelihood of increasing the investment. However, Lerner and 
Tetlock (1999) also summarize prior research suggesting that when individuals expect 
imminent need for justification, they generally modify their opinion to an easily defensible 
neutral point on the opinion scale (Lerner and Tetlock’s 1999), consistent with the status quo 
effect. Further, prior research on the status quo effect finds that the status quo occupies a 
privileged position in decision-making and that accountability magnifies the status quo effect    
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(Tetlock and Boettger 1994). In the presence of high accountability where the need to justify 
is imminent, potential losses from a decision to make a change loom larger than associated 
potential gains, making the status quo easier to defend (Tetlock and Boettger 1994). Thus, the 
first hypothesis suggests that the status quo effect will dominate in CM where justification is 
imminent because maintaining the current level of investment is the easiest decision to 
defend: 
H1: The decision to maintain the current level of investment in an ongoing and 
viable project (status quo) will be perceived ‘easier to defend’ than either 
increasing or decreasing the current level of investment in an ongoing and 
viable project. 
 
For the status quo effect to dominate conformance to the views of the audience 
to whom one is accountable, the status quo decision must not only be defensible, but 
must also be acceptable to the given audience. Tetlock and Boettger (1994) suggest 
that an underlying reason for the status quo effect is that it generally is perceived 
acceptable by evaluators. Decision-makers who stay the course are perceived more 
decisive and principled than those who change their minds, and accountable 
individuals are also less likely to be blamed for a sin of omission for not changing 
(status quo) than for a sin of commission for changing (Tetlock and Boettger 1994). 
In addition, managers may perceive the status quo is acceptable because it is 
consistent with prior decisions and avoids any potential negativity associated with 
admitting there is a need for a change. As a further test that CM evoked the status quo 
effect, we also examine managers’ perceptions of how acceptable the decision to not 
change the investment is to superiors compared to either increasing or decreasing the 
investment. We expect the status quo decision of maintaining the current level of 
investment to be acceptable. Clearly, making a decision to decrease investment 
should be not acceptable because we use the Hunton et al. (2008) context, where the    
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decision to decrease investment represented earnings management. On the other 
hand, the decision to increase investment should be considered acceptable in the 
present context of a long-term project. Stewart and Roth’s (2001) meta-analysis of 
risk propensity in entrepreneurs and managers concludes that individuals who are 
coping with less structured, more uncertain situations tend to be more risk tolerant 
than those who choose more stable and contractual situations. By extension, we 
expect that superiors of project managers may not be perceived as overly risk averse 
since long-term projects are inherently risky. In as much as risk taking propensity is a 
prerequisite for project growth and success, superiors likely positively evaluate 
decisions that involve reasonable, goal congruent risk. Because increasing investment 
was goal congruent in the Hunton et al. (2008) context, we expect that a decision to 
increase investment should also be perceived acceptable. Summarizing, the second 
hypothesis suggests that a decision to maintain the status quo and a decision to 
increase investment will be perceived acceptable, and a decision to decrease the 
investment will be perceived unacceptable, as follows:   
H2: A decision to maintain (status quo), or increase, the current level of 
investment in an ongoing and viable project will be perceived acceptable to a 
manager’s superiors, while a decision to decrease the current level of 
investment in an ongoing and viable project will be perceived unacceptable to a 
manager’s superiors.   
Finding support for both H1 and H2 will suggest that participants in Hunton et al. 
(2008) under CM chose to maintain the current level of investment because the status 
quo was perceived as an acceptable decision to superiors that was also easiest to 
defend.
3 
                                                 
3 One important difference between the two hypotheses is that H1 is focused on the ability of a manager to 
develop a compelling reason supporting a decision (i.e., how difficult a manager perceives it will be to defend 
his or her decision) whereas H2 is focused on the outcome of the decision (i.e., how a superior is perceived to 
rate the decision).    
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
  We build on the experimental design and results from Hunton et al. (2008) to test our 
hypotheses. The two factors in Hunton et al.’s (2008) 2 by 2 between-participants 
experimental design were monitoring frequency (periodic or continuous) and incentive 
horizon (short-term or long-term). Using a vignette methodology (see Wason et al. 2002), 
participants were randomly assigned across the four conditions and asked to respond to a 
manager’s decision that mirrored the results in Hunton et al. (2008). In other words, 
participants were asked to evaluate another’s decision given a certain context, and were not 
asked to respond directly to the context themselves.  
  The vignette methodology is somewhat novel in accounting research, but is more 
common in sociology research, including marketing research, where it is also referred to as 
scenario and factorial survey studies (Wason et al. 2002; Bellizzi and Hite 1989). As in the 
current study, such studies frequently ask participants to judge different decisions made by a 
hypothetical other in different contexts (e.g., approximately 30% of the studies reviewed in 
Wason et al. 2002) and present participants with only one combination of the contextual 
factors to avoid demand effects. Accordingly, we ask our participants to respond to task 
decisions already made by someone else, decisions that reflect the findings of Hunton et al. 
(2008), and not to respond directly to the compensation and monitoring conditions. The 
manipulated monitoring and incentive conditions provided necessary context or background 
for evaluating the decisions. Thus, participants were not asked “What would you do under 
these conditions?” but “What do you think of what person ‘X’ did under these conditions?” 
  Participants were first provided with general information concerning the case 
company. In the case material, a fictitious company had reported approximately $90 million 
in net income in the prior year and had approximately $1 billion in assets. Division managers    
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of the company report to the COO and are closely involved in managing and evaluating 
projects for their division. Return on investment (ROI) is used to evaluate performance of a 
project. Project viability is determined primarily by comparing ROI to the company’s cost of 
capital. 
 Independent Variables 
In the case materials, continuous (periodic) monitoring frequency was presented as 
follows:  
The company’s internal audit department audits divisions on a continuous 
(rotating) basis such that divisions are audited at all times (once every three 
years). On a continual basis, automated software collects (During an 
audit, the auditors collect) actual and projected information on projects from 
the system’s database and tests transactions for unexpected variations, errors 
and control violations. Specifically, sales and production costs are compared 
against projections, and recorded spoilage and quantities returned due to 
defects are examined. Significant variances and control exceptions are 
continuously reported as they occur (reported whenever the audit is 
complete) to the divisional managers, the COO, and other corporate 
management. 
   
The research design held constant the underlying procedures performed, such that the control 
strength and risk of detection from the procedures performed by internal audit were the same. 
We varied only the timing of detection to isolate the impact of frequency of monitoring under 
CM compared to PM. 
We used the same scenarios as Hunton et al. (2008), which is modeled on a 
transactions-based audit with exception alerts. Note that in continuous monitoring, exception 
reports would be sent to upper management immediately, while in periodic monitoring, 
reporting is delayed until the end of the periodic audit. The transactions-based audit with 
exception alerts is a form of substantive testing including analytical procedures that Alles et 
al. (2008) classifies as the continuous data assurance form of continuous auditing. The other 
form is continuous control monitoring (Alles et al. 2008). Many transactions-based audits are    
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limited to individual transactions, such as purchasing or employee expenses (Krell 2006). 
However, Alles et al. (2008) suggests that transaction-based audits employing aggregated 
business process metrics (such as project-level activity in our case) can provide additional 
assurance on the overall behavior of the business process.  
Incentive compensation short-term (long-term) was presented as follows: 
As a divisional manager, Bob is paid a fixed salary and a bonus based on his 
division’s actual annual (three-year moving average) ROI compared to his 
budgeted ROI. Actual annual (three-year moving average) ROI is adjusted 
for any audit findings.  Budgeted ROI is based on expected annual ROI. 
Bonuses start when Bob meets expected annual (three-year moving average) 
ROI and are maximized when he exceeds expected annual (three-year 
moving average) ROI. He can earn up to 30 percent of his annual salary in 
bonuses. 
 
Consistent with our vignette methodology, we changed the scenarios in Hunton et al. (2008) 
to refer to the division manager as “Bob Jones”/“Bob” because the experimental task asks 
participants to assess Bob’s decisions (i.e., a third person who has already made the task-
decisions), which reflects the actual experimental findings of Hunton et al. (2008).   
According to the case, a project for the production of finger-print scanners, a biometric 
device allowing for secure access to desktop and laptop PCs, is presently under the 
supervision of the division manager, named Bob Jones. The project started two years ago. To 
eliminate any possible escalation of commitment effects, the case stated that the project had 
recently been re-assigned to Bob because the original project manager left the company 
earlier that year. The case also stated that the project would have a significant impact on the 
division’s overall ROI performance. 
From its beginning through the first-half of the current year, the finger-print project 
has had several problems. Specifically, its price has been significantly higher than the 
competition’s; it has had a higher than projected defect rate; and its ROI has been lower than 
projected and below cost of capital. On the other hand, there are important indications that    
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these problems are being worked out and that the product’s ROI will rise above the cost of 
capital in the near future. The case also presented participants with material on the effect of 
changing quality control expenditure, along with revised projected ROI’s calculated using 
both increased and decreased quality control expenditures. Though a mix of positive and 
negative information about the finger-print scanner project and its future prospects was 
relayed to participants by the case, the expected long-term ROI was positive.  
Finally, participants were told that the division manager, Bob, had already assessed the 
situation and made the resource allocation decision concerning changing or not changing 
quality control expenditures. The decision relayed to the participants mirrored results from 
Hunton et al. (2008); i.e., in the periodic by long-term condition, participants learned that Bob 
decided to increase the current level of quality control expenditures; in the periodic by short-
term condition, participants read that Bob decided to decrease the current level of quality 
control expenditures; and, in both the continuous conditions, participants found that Bob 
decided to maintain the current level of these expenditures. Thus, participants were not asked 
how they would have made the decision under the various monitoring and compensation 
conditions; rather, they were asked to evaluate Bob’s decisions under those conditions.  
Dependent Variables 
Participants were asked to respond to three dependent variable items along with a 
number of items used to assure that participant assessments of the context were in accordance 
with the underlying theoretical dynamics leading up to the hypotheses. All items were 
measured on a nine-point scale. The dependent variable for H1 asked how difficult it would 
be for Bob to defend his decision to his superiors. Two dependent variables for H2 relate to 
the acceptability of the decision to Bob’s superiors. The two items asked how his superiors 
would rate Bob’s credibility and trustworthiness if they were to discover Bob’s decision.    
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Under a scenario of complete information, high ratings of credibility and trustworthiness 
indicate the decision is acceptable to superiors.  
Administration 
  The experiment was administered by one of the researchers, along with two 
administrative assistants, during an executive education seminar that was held in a large 
metropolitan city in the northeast region of the U.S. The topic of the executive education 
program dealt with Leadership Development. There were two identical one-half-day 
seminars—one on Friday morning and the other on Saturday morning. The experiment was 
administered as soon as the seminar began. On average, it took about 25 minutes to complete.  
There were 22 attendees on Friday and 39 on Saturday. 
  Before the attendees entered the room, we placed a sealed envelope on each desk. The 
envelope contained a voluntary consent form and Part I of the study, which included the 
introduction, background, Bob’s decision, and the dependent variable and other assessment 
items. Once the session started, the attendees were instructed to open the envelope. We 
stressed that their participation was voluntary, and if anyone did not want to participate, they 
were free to leave the room and hang out in the coffee area that was outside of the room. All 
participants volunteered to stay and complete the instrument. We asked everyone to sit quietly 
and raise their hands when they were done with the first part of the study, at which time we 
picked up the materials on their desk and handed them Part II of the study, which included 
manipulation check and demographic items. We also asked them to sit quietly and raise their 
hands when they were done with the final set of questions, at which time we collected the 
final materials. As an incentive to participate, we donated $50 per participant to a charity of 
their choice from amongst a set of 100 IRS-approved charities. 
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Demographics 
 
  The number of participants in each of the four treatment conditions is as follows: 14 
(periodic by long-term), 16 (periodic by short-term), 18 (continuous by long-term), and 13 
(continuous by short-term), yielding a total sample size of 61. Descriptive statistics for the 
demographic variables are displayed in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
  The sample consisted of 15 (25 percent) female and 46 (75 percent) male managers. 
Sixty four percent of the participants held a master’s degree and the remaining held a 
bachelor’s degree; 66 percent of the participants were middle managers and the remaining 
were upper managers; most of the managers worked either in operations (39 percent) or 
finance/accounting/internal auditing (48 percent); the majority of participants worked in the 
financial services sector (66 percent); and most of the managers worked for large firms within 
their respective industries (54 percent). 
  The demographic variables were neither significantly different across treatment 
conditions (the smallest effect value was p = 0.61 for ‘highest degree held’) nor between the 
Friday and Saturday sessions (p = 0.92); thus, the randomization of treatments to participants 
was deemed effective. We also ran GLM multivariate tests comparing the demographic 
variables to the dependent variables. None of the tests were significant, the lowest p-value (p 
= 0.119) reflecting the ‘highest degree obtained’ in relation to one of the context assessment 
items (see Monitoring Effect (Q2) in Table 2). Accordingly, we do not include any of the 
demographic variables as covariates in the main analyses. 
Manipulation Checks 
  All participants responded properly to the following monitoring question, in 
accordance with their randomized monitoring conditions: “Which of the following best    
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describes the internal audit department’s approach to monitoring performance? a) Audits 
divisions on a rotating basis such that all divisions are audited at least once every three years 
or b) Audits divisions on a continuous basis using software that continually collects 
information from the system’s database and tests transactions.”  All participants also 
responded correctly to the following question regarding the bonus incentive conditions: 
“Which of the following best describes the basis for determining Bob’s bonus? a) Actual 
three-year moving average ROI compared to budgeted ROI or b) Actual annual ROI 
compared to budgeted ROI.” Accordingly, the manipulations were considered successful. 
IV. RESULTS 
Context Assessment Items 
  To provide assurance that the participants’ assessment of the case dynamics was 
consistent with post-experiment debriefing findings and expectations from Hunton et al. 
(2008), and with the theoretical development leading to our hypotheses, participants 
responded to two monitoring effect items and five decision assessment items. Wording of the 
items and related statistical test results are shown on Tables 2 and 3. 
Monitoring Effect Analysis   
  We used two monitoring effect items designed to provide assurance that participants’ 
assessments of the monitoring context was consistent with CM reducing information 
asymmetry. The first monitoring effect item assesses the likelihood that the monitoring 
system will detect and report Bob’s decision in the short-term. As expected, the participants 
recognized that CM is very likely to detect and report agents’ actions in the short-term (means 
= 8.06 and 8.23), while PM is very unlikely to do so (means = 1.50 and 1.63). Both are 
polarized on the expected end of the scale and ANOVA results finds a significant main effect 
for monitoring frequency (p < 0.01).    
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The second item asks participants how likely it is that Bob will be asked to justify his 
decision to his superiors in the short-term. Again as expected, participants recognized that it is 
very unlikely that Bob will be asked to justify his decision in the PM conditions (means = 
1.43 and 1.94), while it is very likely that he will be in the CM conditions (means = 6.39 and 
7.08). ANOVA results reveal a significant main effect for monitoring frequency (p < 0.01). In 
addition, a significant main effect for incentive horizon (p = 0.05) is consistent with it being 
more likely that Bob would be asked to justify his decision in the short-term under a short-
term incentive horizon than under a long-term incentive horizon. 
In summary, the monitoring effect analysis is consistent with our theoretical 
expectations that CM decreases information asymmetry by increasing the immediacy of 
detecting managers’ decisions and that CM will result in higher perceived need to justify 
decisions in the short-term. Participants did assess higher likelihood of detection and higher 
need to justify the decision in the two CM compared to the two PM conditions. Thus, 
participants viewed the monitoring condition as an important factor for correctly 
understanding why Bob made the decisions. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Decision Assessment Analysis 
  We used five decision assessment items designed to provide assurance that 
participants’ assessments of the long-term risky project context were consistent with our 
theoretical expectations leading to the status quo hypotheses. The first two items were 
intended to provide assurance about our assumption that increasing the investment was the 
optimal decision in the long-term risky, but viable, project task. The first asked the extent to 
which Bob’s decision is consistent with the long-term success of the project. As expected, 
participants believed that increasing quality control expenditures was definitely consistent    
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with long-term success (mean = 8.71) and decreasing expenditures was definitely not 
consistent with long-term success (mean = 1.38). Maintaining the current level of 
expenditures was near the mid-point of the scale (mean = 6.00).
4 ANOVA results find the 
differences are significant and Scheffe’s multiple pairwise comparisons reveal that increasing 
investment is the optimal decision in the task. 
  The second item related to the optimal decision asked how the decision would be 
related to Bob’s future opportunities for financial rewards and promotions. Again as expected, 
participants believed that increasing quality control expenditures would result in high ratings 
for future opportunities (mean = 6.86) while decreasing expenditures would result in low 
ratings (mean = 1.31). Maintaining the current level of expenditures was near the mid-point of 
the scale (mean = 5.55). ANOVA results find the differences are significant and Scheffe’s 
multiple pairwise comparisons reveal that increasing investment is the optimal decision in the 
task. The results of the first two items support the assumption that the optimal decision in the 
current context was to increase quality control expenditures. 
  The last three items were designed to provide assurance about our assumption that 
decreasing the investment represented an inappropriate earnings management decision. To 
begin, Item 3 asks whether Bob likely made his decision to increase the probability of 
receiving his annual bonus. Participants viewed Bob’s decision to change quality control 
expenditures (either increasing or decreasing) as strongly motivated by his desire to increase 
his annual bonus (mean = 8.36 for increasing expenditures and mean = 8.50 for decreasing 
expenditures).  The decision to maintain the current level of quality control expenditures was 
at the midpoint of the scale (mean = 4.16). ANOVA results suggest the differences are 
significant and Scheffe’s multiple pairwise comparisons indicate that the decision to increase 
                                                 
4 For all analyses related to the decision to increase, decrease, or maintain investment in the project, we 
combined the two CM conditions (short-term and long-term incentives). As an alternative (not shown) we also 
repeat the analyses maintaining all four conditions. Inferences are substantially identical.     
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is equally motivated by bonus maximization as decreasing and both are higher than the status 
quo.    
  Item 4 asked participants to rate the ethics of Bob’s decision. Participants believed that 
increasing expenditures was very ethical (mean = 8.00) and decreasing them was very 
unethical (mean = 1.50). Maintaining the current level of expenditures was also considered to 
be very ethical (mean = 8.00). ANOVA results suggest significant differences and Scheffe’s 
multiple pairwise comparisons indicate that increasing expenditures and the status quo are 
equivalent while decreasing expenditures is significantly less ethical.   
  The final item asks whether Bob would likely have made a different decision if he 
knew that his action would be detected. Participants believed that Bob would very likely not 
make a different decision when the decision increased expenditures (mean = 1.50) and very 
likely would make a different decision when the decision decreased expenditures (mean = 
8.19). Bob was also assessed as not likely to make a different decision when the decision was 
to maintain the current level of expenditures (mean = 1.68). ANOVA results suggest 
significant differences and Scheffe’s multiple pairwise comparisons indicate that increasing 
expenditures and the status quo are equivalent while decreasing is significantly more likely to 
make a different decision.  
  In summary, results from the last three items suggest that the decision to decrease 
expenditures was assessed unethical, likely made to increase the probability of receiving a 
bonus, and that Bob would likely change the decision if he knew it was going to be detected. 
Combined, these results support the assumption that a decision to decrease expenditures is 
representative of inappropriate earnings management. Though participants assessed the 
decision to increase quality control expenditures as ‘bonus’ motivated as well, since the 
decision was also assessed as the optimal decision, it was considered highly ethical. Of note,    
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the decision to maintain the current level of expenditures was also considered highly ethical, 
relative to the decision to increase expenditures. Further, since Bob was assessed not likely to 
change his decision if detected, these results provide an initial indication that the status quo is 
assessed as equally acceptable, though not as optimal, as the increase investment decision.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Hypotheses Testing 
The participating managers responded to three dependent variable items. Wording of 
the items and related statistics are displayed on Tables 4 and 5.  
[INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
H1 predicts that managers will perceive that a decision to maintain expenditures is 
easier to defend than either a decision to increase or decrease the current level of investment. 
We test this prediction using an ANOVA model and Scheffe multiple pairwise comparisons 
(see Table 4). As predicted by H1, the Scheffe comparisons for the ease of defense item 
indicate that maintaining the current level of expenditures (mean = 2.03) is significantly easier 
to defend than either increasing (mean = 4.36) or decreasing (mean = 8.75). Hence, H1 is 
supported. 
H2 predicts that decisions to maintain or increase the current level of investments will 
be perceived acceptable to Bob’s superiors while decisions to decrease expenditures will be 
perceived unacceptable to Bob’s superiors. We test this prediction using ANOVA models and 
Scheffe multiple pairwise comparisons using the final two items, shown in Table 5, as the 
dependent variables. Given that Bob’s superiors have discovered his decision, the questions 
ask how they would rate Bob’s credibility and trustworthiness. As predicted by H2, the 
Scheffe comparisons for the credibility item indicate that maintaining the current level of 
expenditures (mean = 8.06) is equally credible as increasing expenditures (mean = 8.43) and    
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both are significantly more credible than decreasing expenditures (mean = 1.44). A very 
similar pattern is revealed by the Scheffe comparisons for the trustworthiness item. 
Maintaining the current level of expenditures (mean = 8.16) is again equally trustworthy as 
increasing expenditures (mean = 8.07) and both are significantly more trustworthy than 
decreasing expenditures (mean = 1.38). Results of both support H2.  
V. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study is to help explain a dysfunctional effect of monitoring on 
management decision-making reported in Hunton et al. (2008), i.e., an apparent risk aversion 
triggered by continuous monitoring. It is important to understand this phenomenon because 
researchers who study, and firms that institute, continuous monitoring systems need to 
understand these systems’ functional and dysfunctional effects in order to reinforce the former 
and remedy the latter. We find that continuous monitoring appears to trigger an increase in 
managers’ perceived accountability, as manifest by an amplified perceived need to justify 
their decisions. Further, managers believe that maintaining the status quo is the easiest 
decision to defend. At the same time, managers believe that superiors deem the status quo 
decision equally credible and trustworthy as the more optimal decision to increase investment 
in an ongoing, viable and risky project, consistent with the status quo being an acceptable 
decision. Hence, the path of least resistance appears to be the status quo, reflecting a risk-
averse strategy. 
One limitation of our study stems from the scenario used in the experimental 
instrument, i.e., an intratemporal investment decision. While this is an important task 
commonly faced by managers, there are other critical managerial tasks that might be affected 
by continuous monitoring and incentive compensation. Accordingly, it is necessary to be 
cautious in generalizing from the results of the single task investigated in this paper.    
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Additional research should be conducted to establish the generalizability of our findings. 
Similar limitations come from how we operationalized our task. For example, different time 
frames for monitoring and incentive compensation might produce different results. Again, 
future research should be conducted to establish the generalizability of our findings.  
Another limitation to our study is the method we used to obtain responses from our 
participants. By asking participants to comment on someone else’s (i.e., Bob’s) decisions, we 
sought to overcome some of the common problems with instruments using self-reporting; e.g., 
self-presentation bias (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 2002). However, commenting on 
another’s decision may have introduced its own set of limitations. For example, attribution 
theory suggests that our perceptions of others are often biased (Kelley and Michela 1980). 
Future research might try different methods of collecting data than the one used in this study. 
Nevertheless, our results have important implications for research and practice. We 
contribute to research by linking psychology theory with agency theory. Specifically, our 
results indicate that psychology theory concerning perceived accountability (e.g., the 
perceived need to justify a decision, as in our study) complements and extends agency theory 
explanations of risk aversion arising from evaluation apprehension. We also contribute to 
behavioral research on continuous monitoring, a relatively new area of IS/IT research needing 
much attention from both research and practice.  
Our study suggests that continuous monitoring may dampen a ‘healthy risk appetite” 
and that mechanisms may need to be implemented simultaneously with continuous 
monitoring to ensure an appropriate level of risk-taking. This is especially true in situations 
involving the growth and development of new projects. Our findings that continuous 
monitoring resulted in a preference for the status quo regardless of incentive compensation    
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horizon suggests changing the horizon of traditional incentive compensation plans is unlikely 
to be an effective mechanism to remedy the dysfunctional effects of continuous monitoring. 
Our findings suggest that the source of the dysfunctional effects is rooted in 
psychological reactions to increased accountability. Therefore, a more promising source of 
remedy is to consider how to properly channel the increased accountability that inevitably 
results when continuous monitoring is implemented. First, training superiors to recognize the 
status quo effect and communicate with their subordinates where it is unacceptable may help 
reduce the status quo effect (Tetlock and Boettger 1994).  
Second, organizations should explicitly recognize increased accountability and 
consider changing evaluation methods from largely outcome-based to more procedural-based. 
Siegel-Jacobs and Yates (1996) find that procedural accountability, compared to outcome 
accountability, appears to have largely positive effects on decision-making. Procedural 
accountability evaluates the quality of procedures a given decision-maker uses to arrive at a 
decision regardless of the outcome of that decision. Outcome accountability, on the other 
hand, evaluates only the outcome of the decision regardless of the procedures used to arrive at 
the decision. Evaluation mechanisms that support procedural accountability may remedy the 
dysfunctional effects of continuous monitoring. The increased availability of current 
information on decision processes under a continuous monitoring system should make 
procedural accountability much easier to implement than under a periodic monitoring system. 
Evaluation mechanisms that support procedural accountability could include input or process 
oriented compensation contracts or could include a more flexibile budget system that would 
encourage revisiting and revising major decisions when it becomes obvious that a project’s 
underlying conditions were not as expected or have changed. Future research can assist 
practice by identifying the most promising remedy.    
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The current study yields partial, albeit meaningful, insight into the potential economic 
and psychological effects of continuous monitoring of managerial behaviors in the workplace. 
Indeed, more research needs to be conducted along these lines to further place missing pieces 
on this very complex puzzle board.  
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Table 1: Demographic Profile of the 61 Manager-Participants
 
  Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum
Age 
 
41.00 6.22  29  51 
Years of professional work experience 
 
16.67 5.95  5  27 
Years in current position 
 
8.75 5.02  1  23 
 Number Percent     
Gender 
  Female 
  Male 
 
 
15 
46 
 
25% 
75% 
  
Highest degree obtained 
  Bachelors 
  Masters 
 
 
22 
39 
 
36% 
64% 
  
Managerial level of current position 
  Middle manager 
  Upper manager 
 
 
40 
21 
 
66% 
34% 
  
Description of current job function 
  General management 
  Operations management 
  Finance/accounting/internal audit 
 
 
8 
     24 
 29 
 
13% 
39% 
48% 
  
Industry of current employer (two-digit SIC 
code) 
  Retail 
  Financial services 
  Health care 
   
 
9 
40 
12 
 
15% 
66% 
19% 
  
Size of current employer (within industry) 
  Very Large 
  Large 
  Medium 
 
11 
33 
17 
 
18% 
54% 
28% 
  
 
 
All information in Table 1 was self-reported by participants. Results of statistical testing indicate that none of the 
variables is significantly different (p > 0.10) across treatment conditions, suggesting that the randomization of 
treatments to participants was effective. Additionally, none of the demographic variables is significant (p > 0.10) 
as a covariate when analyzing the dependent variables, thus they are not included in the ANOVA models used to 
test the hypotheses. 
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Table 2: Monitoring Effect Items, Wording and Statistics 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
Treatment Conditions 
Monitoring: P = Periodic, C = Continuous 
Incentive: L = Long-Term, S = Short-Term 
  Means (S.D.)  
  P × L  P × S  C × L  C × S 
Monitoring Effect (Q1): How likely is it that the 
monitoring system will detect and report Bob’s 
decision in the short-term? (1 =Very Unlikely, 9 = 
Very Likely) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Monitoring Frequency:   F =   1215.06, p < 0.01 
Incentive Horizon:   F =   0.63, p = 0.43 
Interaction:   F =   0.18, p = 0.90 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05. 
 
 1.50
a     
 
(0.65) 
 1.63
a     
 
 (0.72) 
 8.06
b     
 
 (0.80) 
8.23
b 
 
(0.73) 
Monitoring Effect (Q2): How likely is it that Bob 
will be asked to justify his decision to his superiors 
in the short-term? (1 = Very Unlikely, 9 = Very 
Likely) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Monitoring Frequency:   F =  288.81, p < .01 
Incentive Horizon:   F =   4.06, p = .05 
Interaction:   F =   0.09, p = .76 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = .05 
 
 
 1.43
a     
 
 (0.65) 
 1.94 
a    
 
 (0.68) 
 6.39 
b   
 
 (1.33) 
7.08
b 
 
(1.66) 
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Table 3: Decision Assessment Items, Wording and Statistics 
 
 
Decision Assessment Items 
 
Spending Decisions  
  Means (Standard Deviation)  
 Increase  Decrease  Maintain 
Item 1: Based on the available information, rate 
the extent to which Bob’s decision is consistent 
with the long-term success of the project. (1 = 
Definitely Not Consistent, 9 = Definitely 
Consistent) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 196.467, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
8.71
a 
 
(0.61) 
1.38
b 
 
(0.62) 
6.00
c 
 
(1.32) 
Item 2: If and when Bob’s superiors were to 
discover Bob’s decision, how would you expect 
Bob’s superiors to rate Bob’s future opportunities 
for financial rewards and promotions? (1 = Very 
Low, 9 = Very High) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 86.517, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
6.86
a 
 
(1.41) 
1.31
b 
 
(0.48) 
5.55
c 
 
(1.43)    
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Decision Assessment Items 
 
Spending Decisions  
  Means (Standard Deviation)  
 Increase  Decrease  Maintain 
Item 3: Based on the available information, how 
likely is it that Bob made his decision to increase 
the probability of receiving his annual bonus? (1 = 
Very Unlikely, 9 = Very Likely) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 40.085, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
8.36
a 
 
(0.63) 
8.50
a 
 
(0.73) 
4.16
b 
 
(2.51) 
Item 4: Based on the available information, how 
would you rate the ethics of Bob’s decision? (1 = 
Very Unethical, 9 = Very Ethical) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 380.578, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
8.00
a 
 
(0.78) 
1.50
b 
 
(0.73) 
8.00
a 
 
(0.86) 
Item 5: If Bob knew that his decision would be 
detected, how likely is it that he would have made 
a different decision? (1 = Very Unlikely, 9 = Very 
Likely) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F =  425.295, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
1.50
a 
 
(0.65) 
8.19
b 
 
(0.91) 
1.68
a 
 
(0.75) 
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Table 4: H1 – Dependent Variables, Wording and Statistics 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Spending Decisions  
  Means (Standard Deviation)  
 Increase  Decrease  Maintain 
H1: Ease of Defense: If Bob is asked to justify his 
decisions to his superior, how difficult will it be 
for him to defend his decision? (1 = Very Easy, 9 
= Very Difficult) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 280.825, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
4.36
a 
 
(1.39) 
8.75
b 
 
(0.58) 
2.03
c 
 
(0.80) 
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Table 5: H2 – Dependent Variables, Wording and Statistics 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Spending Decisions  
  Means (Standard Deviation)  
 Increase  Decrease  Maintain 
H2: Decision acceptability (Q1): If and when 
Bob’s superiors were to discover Bob’s decision, 
how would you expect Bob’s superiors to rate 
Bob’s credibility? (1 = Not at all Credible, 9 = 
Very Credible) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 468.995, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
8.43
a 
 
(0.65) 
1.44 
b 
 
(0.63) 
8.06
a 
 
(0.85) 
H2: Decision acceptability (Q2): If and when 
Bob’s superiors were to discover Bob’s decision, 
how would you expect Bob’s superiors to rate 
Bob’s trustworthiness? (Very Untrustworthy, 9 = 
Very Trustworthy) 
 
ANOVA Results: 
 
Spending Decision: F = 198.253, p < 0.01 
 
Different (common) superscripts beside the means 
indicate that the means are (are not) significantly 
different based on Scheffe’s multiple pairwise 
comparison test at alpha = 0.05 
 
8.07
a 
 
(0.73) 
1.38
b 
 
(0.62) 
8.16
a 
 
(1.49) 
 
 
 
 